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however, he apparently is considering the now defunct "character of
the overall action" approach rather than the nature of each individual
issue to be tried. By determining that there was an issue which was
legal in nature, the Court was able to ensure the right to a jury in
situations where the only reason advanced for not using the jury had
been that such a right did not exist in .1791
JOHN THOMAS PROVINCE
THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
UNDER AN IMMUNITY STATUTE
When a wrongdoing public employee is called to testify before a
grand jury under an immunity statute1 he is placed in a most difficult
position. If he refuses to respond to questions he may be held in con-
tempt of the grand jury.2 If he answers untruthfully, he is subject to
criminal prosecution for perjury.3 Most important of all, if he accepts
-the immunity offered him and testifies, he may be dismissed from his
'An "immunity" statute is typified by FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.29 (1944) which
reads:
No person shall be excused from attending and testifying, or produc-
ing any book, paper or other document before any court upon any in-
vestigation, proceeding or trial, for a violation of any of the statutes of
,this state against bribery, buglary, larceny, gaming or gambling, or of any
of the statutes against the illegal sale of spirituous, vinous or malt liquors,
upon the ground or for the reason -that the testimony or evidence, docu-
mentary or otherwise, required of him may tend to convict him of a
crime or to subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, but no person shall
be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account
of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he may so testify
or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, and no testimony so given
or produced shall be received against him upon any criminal investi-
gation or proceeding.
For a thorough compilation of state immunity statues see 8 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE
§ 2281 (McNaughton rev. 1961). For an illustration of how some state courts have
treated their immunity statutes see Note, State Immunity Statutes in Constitutional
Perspective, 1968 Dur. L.J. 311.
2See People v. De Feo, 284 App. Div. 622, 131 N.Y.S.2d 8o6 (1954), rev'd on
other grounds, 3o8 N.Y. 595, 127 N.E.2d 592 (1955); cf. Park v. Johnson, 86 Iowa 475,
53 N.W. 285 (1892). See also United States v. Bryan, g39 U.S. 323 (1950).
'Cameron v. United States, 231 U.S. 710 (1914); Glickstein v. United States,
222 U.S. 139 (1911); United States v. Cason, 39 F. Supp. 731 (W.D. La. 1941);
Gordon v. State, 1O4 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1958); State v. Nolan, 231 Minn. 522, 44
N.W.2d 66 (195o); People v. Berger, 197 Misc. 915, 1OO N.Y.S.2d 278 (Sup. Ct.
1950); State v. Cox, 87 Ohio 313, 101 N.E. 135 (1913).
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job.4 This loss of job with its concomitant deprivations may exceed
the damage he would have incurred due to a criminal conviction. 5
The conflict is one of two competing interests. On the one hand,
the public employee (assuming civil service status) has both a statu-
tory right0 not to be removed from his job except for legal cause7 and
a constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. 8 Competing with
the employee's individual rights is the public's desire for honest gov-
ernment and the need to question their public servants regarding the
execution of duties connected with the public trust.9 The problem
comes into sharper focus when immunity statutes are enacted which
give effect to this public policy by granting immunity from penalty
or forfeiture in return for limited deprivation of the individual's
'Headley v. Baron, 228 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1969). See also Gardner v. Broaderick, 392
U.S. 273 (1968); Uniformed Sanitation Mens' Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392
U.S. 28o (1968); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967); In re Addonizio, 53 N.J.
107, 248 A.2d 531 (1968).
5E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 195.00 (McKinney 1967) provides that "official mis-
conduct" is a class A misdemeanor. This misdemeanor 'is punishable by no more
than one year's imprisonment. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.15 (McKinney 1967). The
losses which could flow from dismissal from public employment could easily exceed
this penalty in terms of financial and reputational losses. This section of the New
York Penal Laws defines "official misconduct" as follows:
A public servant is guilty of official misconduct when, with intent to
obtain a benefit or to injure or deprive another person of a benefit:
i. He commits an act relating to his office but constituting an un-
authorized exercise of his official functions, knowing that such act is un-
authorized; or
2He knowingly refrains from performing a duty which is imposed
upon him by law or is clearly inherent in the nature of his office.
'Whoriskey v. City & County of San Francisco, 213 Cal. App. 2d 4o0, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 833 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); see Johnson v. Trader, 52 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1951);
Kluth v. Andrus, 91 Ohio App. i, 1o N.E.2d 31o, appeal dismissed, 156 Ohio St.
286, 102 N.E.2d 18 (1951), affirmed, 157 Ohio St. 279, 105 N.E.2d 579 (1952).7Greene v. McElroy, 36o U.S. 474 (1959); Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956);
Solchower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183 (1952); Lancaster v. Hill, 136 Ga. 405, 71 S.E. 731 (1911); Smith v. Board of
Educ., 264 Ky. 150, 94 S.W.2d 321 (1936); Carroll v. City Comni'n, 265 Mich. 51,
251 N.. 381 (1933); State ex rel. Hart v. City of Duluth, 53 Minn. 238, 55 N.W.
118 (1893); State ex rel. Nagle v. Sullivan, 98 Mont. 425, 40 P.2d 995 (1935); Hagerty
v. Shedd, 75 N.H. 393, 74 A. 1055 (1909).
'U.S. CoNsr. amend. V; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); People v. Steuding,
6 N.Y.2d 214, 16o N.E.2d 468, 189 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1959).
'See generally Note, Immunity Statutes and the Constitution, 68 COLUm. L.
REV. 959 (1968); Note, State Immunity Statutes in Constitutional Perspective, 1968
DuKE L.J. 311. The terms "public trust" and "public office" are nearly synonymous
and relate to duties and functions performed on behalf of the public. Common-
wealth v. Albert, 307 Mass. 239, 29 N.E.2d 817 (1940); In re Olson, 211 Minn.
114, 3oo N.W. 398 (1941); Wright v. City of Lorain, 70 Ohio App. 337, 46 N.E.2d 325
(1942).
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right to remain silent. 10 Although prohibited from imposing criminal
penalties based on immune testimony which reveals the malfeasance
of a public employee, the authorities will want to remove that em-
ployee from his position of public trust. However, there is some con-
troversy as to whether removal can be based on conduct revealed by
the immune testimony."
In Headley v. Baron,12 the Supreme Court of Florida was faced
with this problem. In overruling the trial and district court,'3 the
court held that an immunity statute,' 4 compelling testimony before a
grand jury, protected .the public employee only from criminal sanctions
and not from loss of his job. 15 This decision expressly overruled prev-
ious holdings of Florida courts that had disallowed administrative
penalties which flowed from immune testimony.' 6
The case under consideration was initiated by a mandamus pro-
ceeding brought by a police captain against the chief of police of
Miami, seeking to compel him to revoke his order dismissing the cap-
tain from the police force.' 7 Baron implicated himself in certain
bribery transactions while testifying under an immunity statute that
"The scope of inquiry that may be invoked due to an individual's position
of public trust has best been defined by Justice Fortas when he stated:
... I would distinguish ... a public employee who is asked questions sped-
fically, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of his official
duties as distinguished from his beliefs or other matters that are not
within the scope of the specific duties which he undertook faithfully to
perform as part of his employment by the State. This court has never
held, for example, that a policeman may not be discharged for refusal
in disciplinary proceedings to testify as to his conduct as a police officer.
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 519 (1966) (concurring opinion); see Note, Immunity
Statutes and the Constitution, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 959 (1968).
"Note, State Immunity Statutes in Constitutional Perspective, 1968 DuuE L.J.
311.
-228 So. "d 281 (Fla. 1969).
"Headley v. Baron, 211 So. 2d 223 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
"FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.29 (1944). The provisions of this statute are set out at
note i supra.
15228 So. 2d at 286.
"Board of Architecture v. Seymour, 62 So. 2d i (Fla. 1952); Hotel &:
Restaurant Comm'n v. Zucker, 116 So. 2d 642 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Beverage
Dep't v. State ex rel. Zucker, 116 So. 2d 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). These
cases do not treat the subject of public employees and to that extent did not
represent a view opposite from Baron. They did represent an attempted disbar-
ment, deprivation of a hotel license, and loss of a liquor license. These actions
were taken pursuant to testimony given under the Florida immunity statute, set
forth at note i supra, and were invalidated by the Florida courts. They were held
to be penalties under the statute and as such were unconstitutionally imposed,
according to these decisions prior to Baron.
17228 So. 2d at 282.
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promised to exculpate him from any "penalty or forfeiture"' 8 aris-
ing from his compelled testimony. The City of Miami Civil Service
Rules provided that any public employee who refused to testify would
be dismissed.19 Rather than treat the apparent constitutional question,
the court relied on a "dictionary approach." It reached the desired
solution to the problem by deciding that the statutory term "penalty
or forfeiture" could not be defined or construed to include the em-
ployee's dismissal from his job. Although the result may have been
consonant with a constitutional analysis, the court did not examine
the constitutional question in arriving at its decision. Despite the
court's statement that no constitutional issue was involved,20 it seems
that the major consideration in assessing the validity of penalizing an
individual, based on compelled testimony, must be the constitutional
impact.
Every citizen has a right against self-incrimination as guaranteed
by the fifth amendment,2 ' which has been held applicable to the
states. 22 The courts have, however, upheld the right of state or federal
authorities to abrogate an individual's right to remain silent if he is
adequately protected from the consequences of his compelled testi-
mony.2 3 What constitutes adequate protection has been the source of
uFLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.29 (1944).
"Civil Service Rules and Regulations of the City of Miami, Rule XVI, § 12
reads in part:
(a) Should any officer or employee in the classified service of the City of
Miami appear before a Grand Jury or Juries and refuse to sign an im-
munity waiver in advance of testimony before such Grand Jury or Juries
and/or refuse to testify fully on all matters concerning the property, gov-
ernment, or affairs of the City, that such conduct shall constitute a breach
of duty and that said employee shall be dismissed from the classified
service of the City of Miami.
(c) No City employee shall be excused on plea of "self incrimination" or
for any other reason, from giving information which may bear on his
own fitness to hold a job; he shall be dismissed for refusing to give such
information.
The Florida court dismissed the applicability of this Civil Service regulation be-
cause Baron had never been requested to sign an immunity waiver. 228 So. 2d
at 283.
228 SO. 2d at 284.
"U.S. CoNsr. amend. V.
2"Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964).
23Haynes v. United States, 39o U.S. 85 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390
U.S. 62 (1968); Marchetti v. United States, 39o U.S. 39 (1968); Reina v. United
States, 364 U.S. 5o7 (196o); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Ex parte Cohen,
104 Cal. 524, 38 P. 364 (1894); State v. Jack, 69 Kan. 387, 76 P. 911 (1904),
afJ'd, 199 U.S. 372 (19o5); State v. Ruff, 176 Minn. 3o8, 223 N.W. 144 (1929);
People v. Sharp, 1o7 N.Y. 427, 14 N.E. 319 (1887).
1970]
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much litigation.2 4 The leading early case of Counselman v. Hitchcock25
held that the immunity must be coextensive with the forfeited privi-
lege. This was initially applied only to the government issuing the
immunity and hence left a witness exposed to prosecution by another
jurisdiction. 26 Later decisions extended the immunity to state and the
federal governments where either had granted immunity27 and to the
individual states where another state had granted immunity.28
The principal area of controversy involves -the scope of immunity
which must be recognized to satisfy the constitutional requisite that
the immunity must be coextensive with the right. Clearly this is not
an absolute standard as there is no right to remain free from loss of
reputation or public ridicule. 29 The constitutional nexus lies at a
point short of this unprotected loss. In Garrity v. New Jersey,s0 police
officers had been convicted of criminal acts on the basis of their testi-
mony given before a grand jury. 1 Pursuant to statute,3 2 had they
failed to testify, they would have lost their jobs. In overturning their
convictions, the Supreme Court held that this choice to either forfeit
their jobs or incriminate themselves was unconstitutional.3 3 The Court
saw the choice forced on appellants in Garrity as the antithesis of free
choice to speak or remain silent as guaranteed by the fifth and four-
teenth amendments.
The Baron court distinguished Garrity34 because it involved the
"E.g., Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959); United States v. Murdock, 284
U.S. 141 (1931); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Counselman v Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547 (1892).
2142 U.S. 547 (1892).
nMills v. Louisiana, 36o U.S. 230 (1959) (per curiam); Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357
U.S. 371 (1958); Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944); United States v.
Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931); Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (19o5); Brown v.
Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
27Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1 (1964).
2Id.
Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 432 (1956) (dissenting opinion);
Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949); Halpin v. Scotti, 415 Ill. 104, 112
N.E.2d 91 (1953); State v. Rodrigues, 219 La. 217, 52 So. 2d 756 (1951); In re
Kelly, 2oo Pa. 43o, 5o A. 248 (1901).
3'385 U.S. 493 (1967).
"Id. at 495.
"N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-17.1 (Supp. 1969).
"385 U.S. at 5oo.
""Baron did not testify before the grand jury because of the 'forfeiture
rule.' His claimed protection here is the 'immunity statute,' not some benefit
or amnesty promised by the 'forfeiture rule.' This distinguishes the instant case
from Garrity v. New Jersey_..." 228 So. 2d at 283.
CASE COMMENTS
"forfeiture" 35 type of statute which made job loss automatic where a
public employee refused to testify. In Baron there was an "immun-
ity"3 0 type of statute which required individuals to testify in return
for guaranteed freedom from penalty or forfeiture. It lacks the coer-
cive element the Court found odious in Garrity.3 7 It is worthy to note,
although the Florida court denied it had any effect, 38 that the Miami
Civil Service Regulations3 9 somewhat embody the Garrity situation
in that they provide for dismissal should a public employee fail to
testify upon request. Had this regulation been invoked in Baron,
there might have been enough to put the police officer in the "rock
and whirlpool ' 40 situation which is forbidden in Garrity.41
The regulation's provision which requires a "waiver of immun-
ity"42 prior to testimony may unconstitutionally infringe upon an
employee's privilege against self-incrimination, but this does not neces-
sarily invalidate the entire regulation.43 Required testimony related
to the employee's job may be permissible if adequate protection is
afforded from criminal prosecution based on immunized testimony.44
6A "forfeiture" statute is one that provides that a public employee shall be
removed from office if he fails to answer questions put to him by a competent
body and relating to his official duties. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-17.1 (Supp.
1969).
3An "immunity" statute is one in which a witness is compelled to testify
and his answers cannot be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution. By er-
moving the possible criminal prosecution, the right against self-incrimination is
not violated. E.g., Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
-Specifically, the Court stated:
The choice given petitioners was either to forfeit 'their jobs or to in-
criminate themselves. The option to lose their means of livelihood or
to pay the penalty of self-incrimination is the antithesis of free choice
to speak out or to remain silent.
385 U.S. at 497.
1228 So. 2d at 283.
"Civil Service Rules and Regulations of the City of Miami, Rule XVI,
§§ 12(a) 8- (c).
'°This term is used to describe a situation where a person must choose the
lesser of two undersirable choices. In the present context, choice of either cannot
be voluntary as it does not possess the elements of a free choice. The term
"rock and whirlpool" situation has been used to describe this choice made under
duress in numerous previous cases. E.g., Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234, 243-44 (1966);
Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593 (1926).
'a385 U.S. at 496.
'2Civil Service Rules and Regulations of the City of Miami, Rule XVI, § 12(a).
"aE.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1952); Lynch v. United
States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934); Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S.
21o (1932). While these cases pertain to severability of statutes, regulations are
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Since Baron did not waive immunity and proceeded to testify pur-
suant to the immunity statute,45 the regulation seems not to have
played a part in coercing his testimony. While it is true that he would
have lost his job pursuant to the regulation had he not testified, he
also would have been subject to contempt of the grand jury under the
immunity statute, and may have gone to jail in addition to losing his
job. The court's disclaimer of the regulation's effect seems to have
been justified.
Further consideration was given to administrative penalties in
Spevack v. Klein,46 where the Supreme Court decided that an attorney
who invoked the fifth amendment could not have this operate to his
detriment in a disbarment proceeding.4 7 The important distinction is
that Spevack did not deal with a public employee4" as did Garrity.
There was no strong countervailing interest on the part of the public
to justify an encroachment on the individual's right.4 9 In the con-
curring opinion it was specifically pointed out that it may be permis-
sible to require public employees to testify regarding their official
dudes. Although this testimony may be invalid for purposes of crimi-
nal prosecution, there are indications that the employee could be
dismissed where wrongdoing is divulged.59
Other recent Supreme Court cases have suggested that absolute
immunity is not required where there is a use restriction complete
enough to adequately protect the witness.5 1 Where Counselman was
concerned with the extent of privilege, a use restriction operates to
limit the utility of the testimony. Murphy v. Waterfront Commis-
sion 52 required states to grant protection from prosecutorial use of the
45FLA. STAT. ANN. § 982-29 (1944).
'4885 U.S. 511 (1967).
4
71d. at 517-18.
"See Franck, The Myth of Spevach v. Klein, 54 A.B.A.J. 970 (1968) for a
discussion as to the advisability of denigrating the attorney's position to the
point that 'there is, allegedly, no public interest served by holding him to a
"higher than normal" legal standard such as that of a public employee.
"0385 U.S. at 520 (concurring opinion).
w'This Court 'has never held ... that a policeman may not be discharged for
refusal in disciplinary proceedings to testify as to his conduct as a police officer."
385 U.S. at 519.
"Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964). A "use" restriction on immune testimony and its fruits operates
to prohibit prosecutors from exploiting the immunized testimony in subsequent
criminal cases. It properly puts the onus on the prosecutor to show that the
prosecution subsequent to an individual's testimony under an immunity statute
is not based on the protected information. This differs from an absolute immunity
which could be extended to cover non-prosecutorial aspects of the immunized
testimony (e.g., non-criminal aspects involving a penalty or loss of 'reputation).
3'78 U.S. 52 (1964).
[Vol. XXVII
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compelled testimony and its fruits. 53 This position was further but-
,tressed in Gardner v. Broderick,5 4 which involved a policeman who
was discharged for refusal to sign a waiver of his rights against self-
incrimination.55 In that case, the Court stated that answers could be
constitutionally compelled, regardless of privilege, if there is im-
munity from federal and state use of the testimony and its fruits
in subsequent criminal proceedings.50 The emergence of a use doctrine
should not be interpreted as a relaxation of the protection afforded
witnesses whose testimony is compelled. Although the information di-
vulged may be in the prosecutor's mind as he accumulates evidence on
related crimes, the heavy burden he must bear in showing that a sub-
sequent prosecution did not result from the compelled testimony
seems to be enough to adequately protect the witness and ensure that
there has been no infringement of his right against self-incrimination. 57
The essential thrust of Garrity and its corollary in Baron seems
to be -that it is permissible to fire a public employee when his wrong-
doing comes to light as a result of testifying under an "immunity"
statute. However, this dismissal cannot be formally embodied in
statutory (and perhaps regulatory) form or it coercively violates the
free choice to speak or remain silent.
The right of the individual has been infringed upon in the Baron
situation but, upon a balancing of interests, it may be that the public's
right to question their officials and to insure honest government out-
weighs this limited incursion into the right to remain silent. Every
constitutional right is subject to limitation when it begins to encroach
upon the welfare of the citizenry at large.5 8 Garrity did not come to
grips with the question of where an individual's rights must be sub-
jugated in favor of the public interest. The New Jersey court in In re
Addonizio 9 observed this when it noted that if Garrity were taken
rId. at 79-80.
r4392 U-S. 273 (1968).
DId. at 274.
01d. at 276; see Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967); Garrity v. New Jersey,
385 U.s. 493 (1967).
rNote, State Immunity Statutes in Constitutional Perspective, 1968 DUKE
L.J. 31n; Note, Federal Immunity Statutes: Problems and Proposals, 37 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 1276 (1969); Note, Immunity Statutes and the Constitution, 68
COLuMf. L. RaV. 959 (1968).
rSJustice Holmes' famous quote, limiting the right of an individual to speak
or to cry fire in a crowded theatre is an example of such limitation. Schenck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47t 52 (1919). See Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 40-48
(1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 574 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
US. 229, 235-38 (1963).
r153 N.J. 107, 248 A.2d 531 (1968).
1970]
